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Abstract
This research suggests that a Darwinian evolution of entrepreneurial spirit played a sig-
nicant role in the process of economic development and the dynamics of inequality within
and across societies. The study argues that entrepreneurial spirit evolved non-monotonically
in the course of human history. In early stages of development, risk-tolerant, growth pro-
moting traits generated an evolutionary advantage and their increased representation ac-
celerated the pace of technological progress and the process of economic development. In
mature stages of development, however, risk-averse traits gained an evolutionary advantage,
diminishing the growth potential of advanced economies and contributing to convergence
in economic growth across countries.
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1 Introduction
This research advances the hypothesis that a Darwinian evolution of entrepreneurial spirit
played a signicant role in the process of economic development and the time path of inequal-
ity within and across societies. The theory suggests that the prevalence of entrepreneurial traits
evolved non-monotonically in the course of human history. In the early stages of development
risk-tolerant, growth promoting traits generated an evolutionary advantage and their increased
representation accelerated the pace of technological advancements, contributing signicantly
to the process of development and the transition from stagnation to growth. As economies
matured, however, this evolutionary pattern was reversed. Risk-averse traits gained an evolu-
tionary advantage, diminishing the growth potential of advanced economies and contributing
to convergence in economic growth across countries. Historical variations in geographical, in-
stitutional and cultural factors which a¤ected the pace of this evolutionary process and thus
the prevalence of growth-promoting entrepreneurial traits across economies, contributed to
contemporary di¤erences in productivity and income per-capita across countries.
Unlike the commonly emphasized forces for economic convergence (i.e., higher returns to
human capital, physical capital, and technological adoption, for laggard countries), the research
proposes that a higher prevalence of growth-promoting entrepreneurial traits in developing
economies contributed to economic convergence. Moreover, the predictions of the proposed
theory provide further understanding of the path of income inequality within a society over time.
The study suggests that as economies mature, inequality subsides due to higher representation
of entrepreneurial traits among lower income individuals. This prediction is consistent with
the class origin of entrepreneurs during the industrial revolution. The failure of the landed
aristocracy to lead the innovative process of industrialization could be attributed to the low
representation of growth promoting entrepreneurial traits within the landed gentry, and their
prevalence among the middle and the lower classes.
The study develops an evolutionary growth theory that underlines the importance of the
evolution of entrepreneurial spirit in the transition from stagnation to growth. It constructs
an overlapping-generations economy that due to the forces of natural selection evolves endoge-
nously from a Malthusian epoch into a state of sustained economic growth. The growth process
is fueled by technological progress that is a¤ected positively by the level of income per worker
as well as by the prevalence of entrepreneurial traits in the economy.1
The theory rests upon two fundamental building blocks. First, technological change is
1The theory is perfectly applicable to either social or genetic intergenerational transmission of entrepreneurial
traits. Allowing preferences to be transmitted both via vertical and horizontal transmission processes might a¤ect
the speed of selection of entrepreneurial spirit in the process of development (Bisin and Verdier [4], Cavalli-Sforza
et al. [8], and Boyd et al. [7]).
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a¤ected positively by the frequency of risk-tolerant traits in the population. The intensity of
entrepreneurial spirit a¤ects the contemporaneous production choices and advances the tech-
nological frontier available to subsequent generations.2 The second central building block is the
heritability of such traits across generations. Consistent with the supposition that entrepre-
neurial spirit is heritable, evidence described in section 1.2, suggests that the trait of novelty
seekinghas been subjected to a selection process in the recent past. More generally, evidence
suggests that evolutionary processes in the composition of existing genetic traits may be rather
rapid, and major evolutionary changes have occurred in the human population over the time
period that is the focus of this study.3
Variations in entrepreneurial spirit among individuals are originated from di¤erences in
the degree of risk aversion with respect to consumption. In the proposed formulation they also
reect di¤erences in the elasticity of substitution between consumption and fertility, capturing
the sensitivity of individuals to changes in relative prices and thus arbitrage opportunities.4
Di¤erences in the degree of risk aversion across individuals a¤ect their reproductive success
and are transmitted across generations, either genetically or culturally. In early stages of
development risk aversion has an adverse e¤ect on fertility and reproductive success, raising the
frequency of risk-tolerant, growth promoting traits in the economy and stimulating the growth
process. However, as economies mature, risk aversion has a benecial e¤ect on reproductive
success, diminishing the growth potential of the economy.
The reversal in the evolutionary advantage of the risk-tolerant traits stems from the
e¤ect of the level of income on the relative cost of consumption and child rearing. As the
economy progresses and income per capita increases, the opportunity cost of child rearing
(indexed to the level of income per capita) increases relative to consumption. At su¢ ciently
low levels of income the cost of children is lower relative to the cost of consumption. Risk-
2The positive association between the frequency of the entrepreneurial individuals in the population and the
rate of technological growth is well documented in the literature, and is at the foundation of the Schumpeterian
viewpoint (e.g., Schumpeter [38], Aghion and Howitt [2]), where the role of entrepreneurs is instrumental in the
process of innovations.
3Voight et al. [40] detected about 700 regions of the human genome where genes appear to have been reshaped
by natural selection within the last 5,000 to 15,000 years. Moreover, a study by Mekel-Bobrov [31] reports that
a variant of the gene ASPM (a specic regulator of brain size in the lineage leading to Homo sapiens) arose in
humans merely about 5800 years ago and has since swept to high frequency under strong positive selection. Other
notable evidence suggests that lactose tolerance was developed among Europeans and Near Easterners since the
domestication of dairy animals in the course of the Neolithic revolution, whereas in regions that were exposed
to dairy animals in later stages, a larger proportion of the adult population su¤ers from lactose intolerance.
Furthermore, genetic immunity to malaria provided by the sickle cell trait is prevalent among descendents of
Africans whose engagement in agriculture improved the breeding ground for mosquitoes and thereby raised the
incidence of malaria, whereas this trait is absent among descendents of nearby populations that have not made
the transition to agriculture (Livingstone [28], Wiesenfeld [45] and Durham [14]).
4There is large literature in economics that has historically linked entrepreneurial propensity to personal
traits. Hayek [23] and Kirzner [24], for example, have stressed the importance of entrepreneursresponsiveness
to incentives and changes in relative prices.
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tolerant individuals, whose choices are more responsive to the relative prices than risk-averse
individuals, optimally allocate more resources towards child rearing and the representation
of their type increases in the population over time. As the economy develops and income per
capita increases, the cost of raising children increases relative to the cost of consumption. Risk-
tolerant individuals optimally allocate more resources towards consumption and less towards
children and the prevalence of entrepreneurial spirit declines over time.
Interestingly, the forces of natural selection are critical for the escape from an epoch of
stagnation. In their absence the economy may remain indenitely in a Malthusian equilibrium.
Namely, if entrepreneurial traits are not hereditary and the distribution of these traits remains
unchanged over time, the level of income per worker may be stationary and fertility will be
at replacement level. Technological advancement will be counterbalanced by an increase in
population growth, whereas adverse technological shocks will be o¤set by population decline.
The predictions of the theory regarding the reversal in the evolutionary advantage of
entrepreneurial, risk-tolerant individuals in more advanced stages of development could be
examined based on the e¤ect of the degree of risk aversion on fertility choices in contemporary
developed and less developed economies. Existing evidence is consistent with the proposed
hypothesis suggesting that risk tolerance is positively associated with the number of children
in less developed economies and negatively in developed economies.5
1.1 Related Literature
The transition from stagnation to growth and the associated phenomenon of the great diver-
gence have been the subject of intensive research in the growth literature in recent years.6 It has
been increasingly recognized that the understanding of the contemporary growth process would
be fragile and incomplete unless growth theory could be based on proper micro-foundations
that would reect the various qualitative aspects of the growth process and their central driving
forces. Moreover, it has become apparent that a comprehensive understanding of the hurdles
faced by less developed economies in reaching a state of sustained economic growth would be
futile unless the factors that prompted the transition of the currently developed economies
into a state of sustained economic growth could be identied and their implications would be
modied to account for the di¤erences in the growth structure of less developed economies in
an interdependent world.
The exploration of the interaction between human evolution and the process of economic
development was pioneered by Galor and Moav [17].7 They advance the hypothesis that during
5See Finkelman and Finkelstein [15]; Miyata [32]; Dohmen et al. [13].
6See e.g., Galor and Weil [19, 20], Galor and Moav [18], Galor [16], Hansen and Prescott [21] and Lucas [29].
7Lagerlöf [27] examines the interaction between the evolution of body size and the process of development
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the Malthusian epoch, when the subsistence-consumption constraint a¤ected the vast majority
of the population, the forces of natural selection operated relentlessly and the survival of the
ttest complemented the growth process, and contributed to the process of industrialization
and the transition of the world economy from stagnation to growth. In particular, they argue
that the Neolithic revolution and the subsequent epoch of Malthusian stagnation triggered a
selection of traits of higher valuation for o¤spring quality, that played a signicant role in the
process of industrialization and the demographic transition.8. The proposed theory highlights
an alternative channel via which the forces of natural selection may have contributed to the
transition from stagnation to growth, underlying the selection of entrepreneurial traits in the
process of development.
The implications of the proposed theory for the class origin of entrepreneurs during the
Industrial Revolution are complementary to those of Doepke and Zilibotti [11, 12]. Their the-
ory suggests that a new class of entrepreneurs rising from the middle classes, imbued with
ethics emphasizing patience and savings, proved most capable of proting from new economic
opportunities, and eventually surpassed the pre-industrial elite. Similarly, the proposed theory
suggests that the failure of the landed aristocracy to lead the innovative process of indus-
trialization could be attributed to the e¤ect of natural selection on the lower prevalence of
entrepreneurial spirit among the landed gentry, and a higher prevalence among the middle and
the lower classes.9
1.2 Genetic Evidence About the Evolution of Novelty Seeking
Evidence from twin studies strongly suggests that a substantial component of the observed
variation in degrees of novelty seeking a trait closely associated with the notion of entrepre-
since the emergence of the Homo sapiens. Spolaore and Wacziarg [39] examine the e¤ect of di¤erences in human
characteristics that are transmitted across generations on the di¤usion of development across countries over the
very long run. Other studies have abstracted from the reciprocal interaction between human evolution and the
process of development and have focused on the e¤ect of the economic environment on the evolution of human
characteristics. Ofek [34] and Saint-Paul [37] examine the e¤ect of the emergence of markets on the evolution of
heterogeneity in the human population. Galor and Moav [18] study the e¤ect of the Neolithic Revolution and
the associated rise in population density on the evolution of life expectancy, and Borghans et al. [5] explore the
e¤ect of human cooperation on the evolution of Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC).
8The evolution of preferences, in a given economic environment, has been explored in the economic literature,
as surveyed by Weibull [41] and Bowles [6], and is explored more recently by Weibull and Salomonsson [42].
Welch and Bernardo [43] establish that overcondent entrepreneurs are evolutionarily optimal in an environment
characterized by poor aggregation of information and herding behavior. Overcondent entrepreneurs provide a
positive information externality to the group they belong to by revealing their own information. Palacios-Huerta
and Santos [35] examine the e¤ect of market incompleteness on the formation of risk aversion, demonstrating that
if the formation of lower risk aversion is costly market completeness and greater risk aversion are complements.
9Moreover, the existence of primogeniture in preindustrial Europe limited social and income mobility between
the landed gentry and the other classes (Bertocchi [3]), allowing the forces of natural selection to di¤erentially
a¤ect the evolution of entrepreneurial spirit across classes, and leading to the observed variations in the involve-
ment of the upper and the middle class in the Industrial Revolution.
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neurial spirit may be attributed to genetic variation (Rodgers et al. [36] and Kohler et al.
[25]).10 In particular, the dopamine receptor D4 (D4DR) gene has been studied extensively in
the biological literature as a potential candidate for moderating novelty-seeking behavior. Al-
though the evidence is still inconclusive, a positive association between a certain polymorphism
in the D4DR (the 7R allele) and novelty-seeking behavior is most widely documented. Fur-
thermore, Ding et al. [10] studying a worldwide population sample, proposed that the 7R allele
originated as a rare mutational event about 40,000 years ago that increased to high frequency
in human populations by positive selection. To the extent that the 7R allele is associated with
novelty-seeking behavior, these ndings are consistent with the basic prediction of the model.
At early stages of economic development risk-tolerant individuals have an evolutionary advan-
tage, and the introduction of such traits in an environment characterized by very low income
levels should have led to an appreciable increase in their representation in the population.
Moreover, complementary evidence suggests that entrepreneurial propensity is heredi-
tary. White et al. [44] examine empirically how entrepreneurial activity is associated with
testosterone levels. They nd that higher testosterone levels are signicantly associated with
prior new venture start-up experience. Increased testosterone levels increase the probability of
entrepreneurial activity both directly and indirectly via the propensity towards risk. This nd-
ing coupled with studies from endocrinology (Meikle et al. [30] and Harris et al.[22] ), which
show that production of testosterone levels is heritable, further substantiate the hypothesis
regarding a genetic heritability of entrepreneurial propensity.11
2 The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy in which economic activity extends over innite
discrete time. In every period the economy produces a single homogeneous good using land
and labor as inputs in the production process. The supply of land is exogenous and xed over
time whereas the supply of labor is determined by the size of the population.
10Cloninger [9] proposed four genetically homogeneous and independent dimensions of personality: novelty
seeking, harm avoidance, reward dependence, and persistence that are hypothesized to be based on distinct
neurochemical and genetic substrates. As elaborated by Kose [26], Individuals exhibiting high novelty seeking
are enthusiastic, curious, and are quick to engage with whatever is new and unfamiliar, which leads to exploration
of potential rewards. Furthermore, they get excited about new ideas and activities easily thus they may be
described as unconventional or innovative." Several studies have shown that a large component of the observed
variation in these behavioral traits can be attributed to genetic di¤erences.
11Nielsen et al. [33] nd that within the group of genes that shows the strongest evidence for positive selection
in humans there are also genes that are involved in spermatogenesis that directly inuence testosterone levels.
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2.1 Production of Final Output
Production occurs according to a constant-returns-to-scale technology that is subject to en-
dogenous technological progress. The aggregate output produced at time t; Yt; is:
Yt = (AtX)
L1 t ;  2 (0; 1); (1)
where Lt is the labor employed in period t; X is the land used in production in every period,
At is the average technological level in period t; and AtX is therefore the e¤ective resources
available during the period.
Suppose that there are no property rights over land.12 The return to land in every period
is therefore zero and output per worker produced at time t; yt; is given by:
yt = [(AtX)=Lt]
; (2)
where (AtX)=Lt is the level of e¤ective resources per worker in period t.
2.2 Preferences and Constraints
In every period t; a generation that consists of a continuum of individuals of mass Lt joins the
labor force. Each individual i has a single parent. Members of generation t (those who join the
labor force in period t) live for two periods. In the rst period of life (childhood), individual
i is economically idle. In the second period of life (parenthood) individual i of generation t is
endowed with 1 unit of time. The individual works and generates income, yit:
Every generation t consists of two types of individuals, 1 and 2, distinguished by the
degree of risk aversion with respect to consumption. Preferences are transmitted without
alteration from generation to generation within a dynasty either genetically or culturally. The
distribution of types within each period evolves over time due to the e¤ect of natural selection
on the reproductive success of each type.
The utility function of individual i in period t is dened over consumption, cit; and
children, nit; in period t:
13
uit =
8><>:
cit + n
i
t for i = 1
(cit)
1 
1  + n
i
t for i = 2;
(3)
12The modeling of the production side is based upon two simplifying assumptions. First, capital is not an
input in the production function, and second the return to land is zero. Alternatively it could have been assumed
that the economy is small and open to a world capital market in which the interest rate is constant. In this
case, the quantity of capital will equalize its marginal product to the interest rate, while the price of land will
follow a path such that the total return on land (rent plus net price appreciation) will be equal to the interest
rate. Allowing for capital accumulation and property rights over land would complicate the model to the point
of intractability, but would not a¤ect the qualitative results.
13For simplicity, the analysis abstracts from child mortality risk. Alternatively one can interpret the preferences
such that parents derive utility from the expected number of surviving o¤spring and the cost of child rearing is
associated only with surviving children.
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where  > 1; and  > 1 is the degree of risk aversion which also governs the elasticity of
substitution. The higher is  the more risk-averse is type 2.14 Di¤erences in the risk attitude
are the only source of heterogeneity within a generation and the distribution of types changes
therefore due to the e¤ect of natural selection.
Individuals allocate their income, yit, between consumption, c
i
t; and expenditure on child
rearing. The cost of raising a child is assumed to be a fraction  < 1=2 of the level of output
per worker in the economy, yt.15 Hence, individual i0s budget constraint is
ytn
i
t + c
i
t  yit; (4)
where ytnit is the cost of raising n
i
t children in period t:
2.3 Innovations
In each period t individual i can be engaged in either safe or risky production. Individual i
can use the safe production technology in period t; At; that reects the successful modes of
production of the previous period. Individual i that operates under this safe production mode
generates income yit = [(AtX)=Lt]
: Alternatively, individual imay choose to experiment with a
risky technology. If the experimentation is successful the individual will operate with a superior
production technology, AHt > At; and will generate a higher income y
i;H
t = [(A
H
t X)=Lt]
 > yt:
However, if the experimentation is unsuccessful the individual will operate with an inferior
production technology, ALt < At; and will generate a lower income, y
i;L
t = [(A
L
t X)=Lt]
 < yt:
Let p be the probability of successful experimentation. Suppose that the expected return
associated with the risky production mode is equal to the one associated with the safe mode
of production. Namely,16
pAHt + (1  p)ALt = At: (5)
Individual i will be engaged in the risky production mode as long as expected utility from
the risky production mode is at least as large as the utility from the safe one. Thus it follows
from (5) that risk-averse type 2individuals will choose the safe mode of production, reecting
14The linearity of the utility function with respect to the number of children, reects the fact that as shown
in Section 5 risk neutrality with respect to children is the trait that will be selected in the long-run. Moreover,
allowing for 0 <   1 will not e¤ect the qualitative results. However, 0 <  < 1 will result in the undesirable
extinction of the population in the long run, and  = 1 will add an additional case to be considered without any
additional insights.
15Thus, the cost of child rearing is indexed to the income of the average person in each generation.
16The assumption imposed on the returns to innovation is deliberately chosen to abstract from lifetime income
heterogeneity across types. Allowing for entrepreneurial activity to generate higher expected income, in an era
in which the latter is converted into larger number of surviving o¤spring, would accentuate the evolutionary
advantage of the growth-promoting type. Moreover, as it will become apparent, in advanced stages of economic
development higher income would not have a positive e¤ect on fertility for the risk-neutral type and thus the
selection of entrepreneurial traits would not be a¤ected.
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the fact that the (non-compensated) variance of the expected income deters experimentation
with risky productive methods. Consequently, individuals of type 2 will generate income equal
to the average income in the economy in period t, i.e.,
y2t = yt: (6)
Risk-neutral type 1 individuals, on the other hand, because of their constant marginal
utility with respect to consumption and fertility, undertake the risky production mode. Hence,
a fraction p of the risk-neutral individuals will generate higher income than the risk-averse
type, whereas a fraction (1  p) will generate lower income. In particular,
y1t =
8<:
y1;Ht with probability p
y1;Lt with probability 1  p:
(7)
It follows from (5) that the average income across the two types will be the same in
each period t. Nevertheless, the engagement of the risk-neutral type in risky technological
innovations a¤ects the technology that is available to the next generation. In particular, new
productive knowledge will be generated by a fraction p of risk-neutral individuals and sub-
sequent generations reap the technological benets of this experimentation. Thus, societies
dominated by risk-averse individuals are associated with lower degree of experimentation, pas-
sively transmitting the existing productive knowledge from one generation to the next.
2.4 Optimization
2.4.1 The Risk-Averse Type
The risk-averse type 2 in generation t chooses the number of children, and therefore personal
consumption, so as to maximize the utility function (3), subject to the budget constraint (4).
Namely:
n2t = argmax
(
(c2t )
(1 )
1   + n
2
t
)
; (8)
subject to:
c2t = yt(1  n2t )  0;
n2t  0:
The consumption of individual of type 2 as a function of the income level yt is:
c2t (yt) = (yt=)
1= ; (9)
where @c2t =@yt > 0.
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The number of children of individual of type 2 as a function of the income level yt is:
n2t = n(yt) 
8<:
0 if yt  (=)1=(1 )  ~y
[1  (=)1=yt(1 )=]= if yt > (=)1=(1 )  ~y:
(10)
Hence, as depicted in Figure 1, the fertility rate of individuals of type 2 in period t, n2t ;
is a weakly increasing, concave function of yt:
@n2t
@yt
=
8<:
0 if yt < (=)
1=(1 )
[(   1)(=)1=y(1 2)=t ]= if yt > (=)1=(1 ):
(11)
Lemma 1 Fertility is above replacement for individuals of type 2 if income per worker exceeds
= ; i.e.,
n2(yt) > 1 if yt  = :
Proof. See Appendix. 
2.4.2 The Risk-Neutral Type
As established in Section 2.3 risk-neutral individuals engage in experimentation which yields
higher or lower income depending on whether their innovation e¤orts are successful. Hence,
there is income heterogeneity within type 1 where each individual j of type 1 generates income
y1;jt with j = fH;Lg.
Individual j of type 1 in period t chooses the number of children and therefore own
consumption, so as to maximize (3) subject to (4):
n1;jt = argmax
n
c1;jt + n
1;j
t
o
(12)
subject to
c1;jt = y
1;j
t   ytn1;jt  0;
n1;jt  0:
The consumption of individual j of type 1 as a function of the income level y1;jt is:
c1;jt = ct(y
1;j
t ; yt) 
8<:
0 if 0 < yt < =
y1;jt if yt > =;
(13)
where @c1;jt =@y
1;j
t  0:
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The number of children of an individual j of type 1 as a function of the income level y1;jt
is:
n1;jt = n(y
1;j
t ; yt) 
8<: (y
1;j
t =yt) if 0 < yt < =
0 if yt > =:
(14)
At low stages of development, when average income is su¢ ciently low (i.e., yt < =) the
relative cost of raising a child, yt; is lower than  (i.e., the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and fertility) and risk-neutral individuals allocate all resources to children. As the
economy develops and average income increases, the relative cost of raising a child increases.
Thus, at su¢ ciently high stages of development (i.e., yt > =) the relative cost of raising
a child, yt; is higher than  and risk-neutral individuals allocate all resources towards own
consumption.
The fertility rate of individual j of type 1 in period t, n1:jt ; is a non-negative, non-
decreasing function of the income, y1;jt : In particular,
@n1;jt
@y1;jt
=
8<:
1=yt if 0 < yt < =
0 if yt > =
, (15)
and @2n1;jt =@
2y1;jt = 0:
3 The Process of Development
The process of development is governed by the time path of the level of technology, income per
worker and the composition of the risk attitudes in the population.
3.1 The Evolution in the Composition of Types
Suppose that at time 0 the economy consists of a continuum of individuals of mass of L0; where
o represents the fraction of type 1 in the population.
In accordance with the historical pattern of fertility, income per worker is assumed to be
su¢ ciently high in every period, so as to assure that fertility rates are positive for both types
in the population. Hence in light of (10) it is assumed that income per-worker in period 0 is
su¢ cient to allow the risk-averse type to allocate positive resources towards child-rearing, i.e.
y0 > ~y:
The evolution of the fraction of the risk-neutral traits in the population over time is
determined by the average fertility rates of the two types of individuals. As derived in (10),
since there is no income heterogeneity across individuals of type 2; fertility of each individual
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of type 2 is n2t : However, income and thus fertility decisions di¤er across successful and non-
successful individuals of type 1. In particular, the average fertility across individuals of type 1
in each period t is:
n1t = pn
1;H
t + (1  p)n1;Lt ; (16)
where n1;Lt and n
1;H
t are given in (14).
Lemma 2 The average fertility of a risk-neutral individual type 1 in the process of devel-
opment is:
n1t = n
1
t (yt) 
8<:
1= if 0 < yt < =
0 if yt > =:
Proof. Follows from (14) and (16). 
The subsequent corollary follows from (10) and Lemma 2.
Corollary 1 For a given level of average income yt in period t
n1t (yt) =
8<:
> n2t (yt) if 0 < yt < =
< n2t (yt) if yt > =:
Hence, as depicted in Figure 1, in early stages of development (i.e., 0 < yt < =);
the entrepreneurial types type 1 have an evolutionary advantage, whereas as soon as the
economy progresses su¢ ciently (i.e., yt > =); the risk-averse individuals type 2 gain the
11
evolutionary advantage.
i
tn
ty0
τ/1
)(1 tt yn
),(2 qtt yn
tg /y~
Figure 1. Reversal in the Evolutionary Advantage in the Process of Development.
Given the size of the population in period t; Lt; the size of the population in period t+1;
Lt+1; is:
Lt+1 = n1ttLt + n
2
t (1  t)Lt; (17)
where t is the fraction of risk-neutral individuals (type 1) in the population and n
1
t and n
2
t
denote the average fertility for types 1 and type 2; respectively.
The fraction of individuals of type 1 in the population in period t+1; t+1; is therefore:
t+1 =
tn
1
t
tn
1
t + (1  t)n2t
: (18)
Hence, it follows from (10) and (14) that
t+1 = (t; yt) 
8><>:
t
t+(1 t)[1 (=)(1=)y(1 )=t ]
if 0 < yt < =
0 if yt > =:
(19)
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Lemma 3 The Properties of (t; yt)
For yt < =;
1: (0; yt) = 0 and (1; yt) = 1
2: (t; yt) > 0 and (t; yt) < 0:
Proof. See Appendix. 
Hence, as depicted in Figure 2, for a given level of income per worker, yt; the fraction of
risk-neutral individuals in the population increases monotonically over time and approaches 1;
if 0 < yt < =; whereas this fraction vanishes; once yt > =:
0 1
);(1 ttt ybfb =+
tb
1+tb
1
0 < yt  =
Figure 2. The Evolution of the Proportion of Risk-Neutral Individuals, t:
3.2 Technological Progress
As established in section 2.3, technological progress, gt+1; that takes place between periods t
and t+ 1 depends on the fraction of risk-neutral individuals, within the working generation in
period t; t: Furthermore, it is assumed to be a function of the level of income per worker in
period t, yt: Namely,17
17The positive role of income per capita in technological progress is well established. In a Malthusian en-
vironment, a higher level of income per capita will be associated with a larger population that would have a
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gt+1  At+1  At
At
= g(t; yt): (20)
Suppose the rate of technological progress between period t and t + 1 is a (weakly)
positive, (weakly) increasing, concave function of the fraction of entrepreneurial individuals
among the working generation at time t and the level of income per-worker, i.e.,
gy(t; yt)  0 and gyy(t; yt)  0 8t 2 [0; 1] and 8yt > 0
g(t; yt)  0 and g (t; yt)  0 8t 2 [0; 1) and 8yt > 0
: ((A1))
The time path of the level of technology is given therefore by:
At+1 = (1 + gt+1)At; (21)
where the level of technology at time 0 is given at a level A0:
3.3 The Time Path of Income Per Worker
As follows from (2), (17), (20) and (21) income per worker in period t+ 1 is:
yt+1 =

At+1X
Lt+1

=

AtX
Lt
 [1 + g(t; yt)]
tn
1
t + (1  t)n2t

: (22)
Thus,
yt+1 = yt

[1 + g(t; yt)]
tn
1
t + (1  t)n2t )

: (23)
Hence, it follows from (10) and Lemma 2 that the income per worker in period t + 1 is
determined by the level of income per worker in period t; yt; and the fraction of entrepreneurial
individuals in the adult population, t:
yt+1 =  (t; yt); (24)
where
 (t; yt) 
8>>>><>>>>:
yt

[1+g(t;yt)]
ft+(1 t)[1 (=)1=y(1 )=t ]g=

if 0 < yt < =
yt

[1+g(0;yt)]
[1 (=)1=y(1 )=t ]=

if yt > =:
(25)
An increase in the fraction of the entrepreneurial individuals, t; has unambiguously
positive e¤ects on the level of income per worker in period t+1; yt+1 = (At+1X=Lt+1)
 ; in an
positive e¤ect on the supply, the demand, and the di¤usion of knowledge. Moreover, it will foster specialization
and trade and will therefore enhance technological progress. In the industrial world higher income per capita
will support a more educated population that is more likely to implement new technologies, and will generate a
wider tax base that would permit extensive investment in infrastructure, education and research.
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environment where risk neutrality is conducive to individuals reproducing at lower rates, (i.e.,
when yt > =): It raises the level of technology in period t + 1; and reduces the population
growth rate between periods t and t+1. However, when yt < = and thus the entrepreneurial
type reproduces at a higher rate, an increase in the fraction of these individuals (type 1) in
period t has an ambiguous e¤ect on output per-worker in t+ 1 since it has a positive e¤ect on
both the level of technology and population in period t+ 1:
An increase in output per worker, yt; has ambiguous e¤ects on the level of income per
worker in period t+1: On the one hand, it increases the level of technology in the next period,
At+1; positively a¤ecting output per worker, but on the other hand, it increases fertility rates
in period t; and thus the size of the population in period t+ 1; adversely a¤ecting income per
worker.
4 The Dynamical System
The evolution of the economy is fully determined by the evolution of the fraction of risk-neutral
individuals, t; and the level of output per worker, yt: It is given by the sequence ft; ytg1t=0
that is governed by the two-dimensional non-linear discrete dynamical system:
t+1 = (t; yt)
yt+1 =  (t; yt);
(26)
where (0; y0) is given.
The analysis of this two-dimensional dynamical system will require the derivation of its
phase diagram, based on the characterization of the  locus under which t is in a steady-
state, the yy locus under which yt is in a steady-state, and the forces that operate on the system
when the variables are not in a steady-state equilibrium.
4.1 The  locus
The  locus is the geometric locus of all pairs (t; yt) such that t is in a steady state.
  f(t; yt) : t+1   t = 0g:
As follows from (19), along the  locus
(t; yt)  t = 0: (27)
Lemma 4 The properties of the  locus:
t+1   t
8<:
> 0 if 0 < yt < = &   (0; 1)
= 0 if [t = 0] or [t = 1 & yt < = ]
< 0 if yt > = &   (0; 1] :
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Proof : As follows from (18)
t+1   t =
t(1  t)[n1(yt)  n2(yt)]
tn
1(yt) + (1  t)n2(yt)
:
Hence, as follows from Corollary 1:
t+1   t
8<:
> 0 if 0 < yt  = &   (0; 1)
= 0 if [t = 0] or [t = 1 & yt  = ]
< 0 if yt > = &   (0; 1]:
:

As depicted in Figure 3, the fraction of risk-neutral individuals, t; is in a steady state
if:
(a) t = 0 i.e., there are only individuals of type 2 in the population and thus there are
only individuals of type 2 in all future periods.
(b) t = 1 i.e., there are only individuals of type 1 in the population and average income
in the population is less than = .
4.2 The Replacement Locus - yyR
The replacement frontier yyR , as depicted in Figure 3, is the geometric locus of all pairs (t; yt)
such that the average level of fertility is at replacement level, i.e.,
yyR  f(t; yt) : tn1(yt) + (1  t)n2(yt) = 1g: (28)
Lemma 5 The properties of the replacement locus - yyR
1. There exists a continuous single-valued function, yR(t); such that given (t; y
R(t)) the
average fertility level is at replacement, i.e.,
(t; y
R(t)) 2 yyR 8t 2 [0;  ] ;
where
yR() = ~y
yR(t) < = 8t 2 [0;  ]:
2. The level of income that corresponds to replacement fertility, yR(t); is monotonically
decreasing in the fraction of entrepreneurial individuals, t; i.e.,
@yR(t)
@t

yyR
< 0 8t 2 [0;  ] :
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3. The average level of fertility is below replacement if and only if yt < yRt (t) and above
replacement if and only if yt > yR(t); i.e.,
tn
1(yt) + (1  t)n2(yt) < 1 iff yt < yRt (t)
tn
1(yt) + (1  t)n2(yt) > 1 iff yt > yRt (t)
:
Proof. See Appendix. 
The replacement locus, depicted in Figure 3, is downward sloping.18 As established
in Corollary 1, for an income below = ; as the fraction of the risk-neutral individuals, t;
increases, fertility increases and thus the level of income that is needed to support replacement
fertility, yR(t); is lower.
4.3 The yy locus
The yy locus is the geometric locus of all pairs (t; yt) such that yt is in a steady state,
yy  f(t; yt) : yt+1   yt = 0g:
As follows from (23) and (25), along the yy locus
 (t; yt)  yt = yt

(1 + g(t; yt))
tn1(yt) + (1  t)n2(yt)

  1

= 0: (29)
Hence,
yt+1   yt R 0, 1 + g(t; yt) R [tn1(yt) + (1  t)n2(yt)]: (30)
In order to simplify the exposition and to assure that the economy may escape from the
Malthusian trap, few boundary conditions are imposed on the function g(t; yt):
g

(t; yt) < n
1(yt)  n2(yt) for yt 2 (0; y] if and only if t 2 [0; ];
gy(t; yt) < t
@n1 (yt)
@yt
+ (1  t)@n2 (yt)@yt if and only if yt 2 (0; y];
g(t; yt) =
8<:
= 0
> 0
if and only if
yt  yR(t)
yt > y
R(t);
((A2))
where  2 (0; ) and y = y() 2 (yR(t); =):
Lemma 6 The properties of the yy locus.
Under (A1) and (A2)
18Without loss of generality, Figure 3 is drawn under the assumption that the yyR locus is convex. Note,
however that as long as the locus is downward sloping the qualitative analysis remains intact.
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1. There exists a continuous single-valued function, yR(t); such that
(t; y
R(t)) 2 yy 8t 2 [0;  ]:
2. There exists a decreasing continuous, single-valued function y(t) 2 (yR(t); =) such
that
(t; y(t)) 2 yy and y0(t) < 0 8t 2 [0; ^)
where limt!^y(t) = y
R(^), y(0) 2 (y; =), and ^ 2 [; ):
3.
yt+1   yt
8<: < 0 iff y
R(t) < yt < y(t) and t 2 [0; ^)
> 0 otherwise
Proof. See Appendix. 
The yy locus is depicted in Figure 3. The yy locus consists of two downward sloping
segments: (i) the replacement locus, yyR; and (ii) a single valued function y(t) that intersects
the yyR locus at ^ and the  locus at (0; y(0)):
4.4 Steady-State Equilibria
Steady-state equilibria of the dynamical system are pairs (; y) such that:
 = (; y)
y =  (; y)
: (31)
Hence a steady-state equilibrium is characterized by an intersection of the  locus and the yy
locus. As depicted in Figure 3, the system is characterized by two steady-state equilibria.
Lemma 7 The dynamical system has two steady-state equilibria:
(; y) = f(0; y(0)); (0; yR(0))g:
The steady-state equilibria: (0; y(0)) is unstable, and (0; yR(0)) is a saddle.
lim
t!1(t; yt) = (0; y
R(0)) if and only if 0 = 0 & yt < y(0):
Proof. The lemma follows from the properties of the  locus and the yy locus as established
in Lemmas 4 and 6, and as depicted in Figure 3. 
Corollary 2 If the initial fraction of the entrepreneurial individuals is greater than zero, i.e., if
0 > 0; then in the long-run the fraction of entrepreneurial individuals vanishes asymptotically,
whereas the level of output per-worker grows indenitely, i.e.,
lim
t!1(t; yt) = (0;1) if 0 > 0:
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Proof. The corollary follows from Lemmas 4-7, and the implied motion in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. The Evolution of Entrepreneurial Spirit
and the Process of Development.
4.5 The Evolution of Entrepreneurial Spirit and the Process of Development
Suppose, without loss of generality, that the economy starts with an income per-worker ,
yR(0); that is just su¢ cient to generate replacement fertility, as was the case during the
Malthusian epoch. That is, the economy starts on the yyR locus. Suppose further that there
is a small fraction of risk-neutral individuals in the economy, 0 < ^. As depicted in Figure
3, the forces of natural selection will increase the representation of these risk-neutral growth
promoting individuals in society, and once this fraction will exceed the critical level ^; income
will increase monotonically along with the fraction of the risk-neutral entrepreneurial traits.
Once the level of income per-worker increases above the threshold level of income = ; the
evolutionary advantage is reversed. Risk-averse individuals generate an evolutionary advantage
and  declines to 0:
Interestingly, in the absence of the forces of natural selection the economy will remain
indenitely in a Malthusian equilibrium. That is, if entrepreneurial traits are not hereditary
19
and the distribution of types remains unchanged over time, the level of income per worker
will remain at a level yR(0); where fertility is at replacement. This will constitute a stable
Malthusian equilibrium.
5 Variations in the Risk Attitude Towards Children
This section demonstrates that risk neutrality with respect to children is the type of behavior
that would be selected in populations that have been expanding over time, and thus the utility
function that is adopted in the main analysis is the appropriate one.
Suppose that preferences of individuals i are represented by a utility function with con-
stant relative risk aversion with respect to consumption, ; and (heterogeneous) risk attitudes
with respect to children, i;
uit =
(cit)
1 
1   + 
 
nit
1 i
1  i ; i  0: (32)
Members of generation t choose the number of children, and therefore own consumption
to maximize the utility function (32) subject to the budget constraint. Thus, the optimization
problem of a member of generation t is:
nit = argmax
(
(cit)
1 
1   + 
 
nit
1 i
1  i
)
: (33)
Subject to:
cit = yt(1  nit)  0
nit  0:
The solution of the optimization problem is interior. It is given by the implicit function:
z
 
nit; i

= 
 
nit
 i   yt [yt(1  nit)]   0: (34)
As established in the following Lemma, as long as fertility rates are above replacement
the more risk tolerant type in terms of children has the evolutionary advantage. If fertility
rates are below replacement (and the population therefore vanishes over time), the type that
is more risk-averse with respect to children gains an evolutionary advantage.
Lemma 8 The e¤ect of risk aversion with respect to fertility on reproductive success is negative
as long as fertility is above replacement and is positive as long as fertility is below replacement.
@nit
@i
8>>>><>>>>:
< 0 i¤

nit > 1
= 0 i¤

nit = 1
> 0 i¤

nit < 1
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Proof. Using the Implicit Function Theorem, it follows from (34) that:
@nit
@i
=  @z
 
nit; i

=@i
@z
 
nit; i

=@nit
=    
 
nit
 i lnnit
   nit i 1    (yt)2 [yt  1  nit]  1 : (35)
where,
@z(nit;i)
@i

< 0 if nit > 1
> 0 if nit < 1
@z(nit;i)
@nit
< 0
: (36)
Hence,
sign

@nit
@i

= sign
"
@z
 
nit; i

@i
#
> 0 if nit < 1
< 0 if nit > 1
: (37)
Thus the lemma follows from (37). 
Since the human population has not become extinct, fertility has not been below re-
placement and the distribution of risk attitudes with respect to children converges towards
risk-neutrality in the long-run.19
Corollary 3 Risk neutrality with respect to children, i.e., i = 0; will be selected in the long-
run.
Hence, risk neutrality with respect to children that was imposed on the utility function
in the main part of the paper, is the trait that will be selected in the long-run.
6 Concluding Remarks
This research suggests that a Darwinian evolution of entrepreneurial spirit played a signi-
cant role in the process of economic development and the evolution of inequality within and
across societies. The study argues that entrepreneurial spirit evolved non-monotonically in the
course of human history. In early stages of development, risk-tolerant, growth promoting traits
generated an evolutionary advantage and their increased representation accelerated the pace
of technological advancements and the process of economic development. In mature stages of
development, however, risk-averse individuals gained an evolutionary advantage diminishing
the growth potential of advanced economies.
The research identies a novel force that operates towards a convergence of developing
economies to the richer ones. Unlike the commonly underlined forces of economic convergence,
19Segments of the human population that have been shrinking over time, but have not become extinct, would
compose of more risk averse individuals with respect to fertility.
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the research suggests that convergence is triggered by the higher prevalence of individuals with
entrepreneurial traits in lower income economies.
The prediction of the theory regarding the evolution of inequality and entrepreneurial
activities within a society is consistent with the pattern observed in England during the course
of the Industrial Revolution. In particular the theory suggests that the failure of the landed
aristocracy to lead the innovative process of industrialization could be attributed to the low
representation of entrepreneurial individuals within this group, and the prevalence of individuals
with entrepreneurial traits among the middle and the lower classes.
Country-specic characteristics that have a¤ected the intensity of the pivotal interaction
between the rate of technological progress and the composition of the entrepreneurial traits
within the population have generated variations in the transition from stagnation to growth and
contributed to the disparity in income per capita across countries. Variations in institutional
and cultural characteristics across societies a¤ected the evolutionary process, stimulating the
pace of the transition from stagnation to growth (Acemoglu et al. [1]). In particular: (a) The
level of protection of intellectual property rights had an ambiguous e¤ect on entrepreneurial
activities, reecting the trade-o¤ between the positive e¤ect of intellectual property rights on
the incentive to innovate and its adverse e¤ect on the proliferation of existing knowledge. (b)
The stock of knowledge in a society and its rate of creation and di¤usion created a platform on
which faster technological innovations can emerge. (c) The composition of cultural and religious
groups in a society and their attitude toward knowledge creation and di¤usion a¤ected the
incentives to innovate. (d) The composition of interest groups in society generated incentives
to block or promote technological innovation.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
As follows from (10) and (11) n2(yt) > 1 for all yt  = if n2(=) > 1 and therefore if
[1  (=)]= > 1; which is satised since  < 1=2 and  > 1. 
Proof of Lemma 3.
As follows directly from (18), (0; yt) = 0 and (1; yt) = 1 for yt < =:
Di¤erentiating (19),
(t; yt) =
n1tn
2
t
[tn
1
t + (1  t)n2t ]2
> 0; (38)
and as follows from Corollary 1
(t; yt) =  
2n1tn
2
t (n
1
t   n2t )
[tn
1
t + (1  t)n2t ]3
8<:
< 0 if 0 < yt < =
> 0 if yt > =
: (39)

Proof of Lemma 5.
1. As follows from Lemma 1 and Corollary 1
n1(=) > n2(=) > 1: (40)
Hence, the average level of fertility is at the replacement level only if:
yR(t) < = 8t 2 [0;  ] : (41)
Furthermore, since n1(yt) = 1= for all yt  = ; it follows that if the fraction of individuals
type 1 in the population is equal to  , their fertility is such that the population as a whole will
have replacement fertility only if the fertility of individuals of type 2 is equal to zero. Hence,
noting (43),
yR() = ~y ; (42)
where n2(~y) = 0:
As follows from (28) there exists a function 
(t; y
R
t ) such that:

(t; y
R
t ) = tn
1(yRt ) + (1  t)n2(yRt )  1  0: (43)
Hence,
@
(t; y
R
t )=@y
R
t = t
@n1(yRt )
@yRt
+ (1  t)
@n2(yRt )
@yRt
> 0: (44)
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Thus, it follows from the Implicit Function Theorem, that there exists a continuous single-
valued function, yR(t); such that:
(t; y
R(t)) 2 yyR 8t 2 [0;  ] : (45)
2. As follows from from (43)
@yR(t)
@t

yyR
=  @
(t; y
R
t )=@
R
t
@
(t; y
R
t )=@y
R
t
=   n
1(yRt )  n2(yRt )
t
@n1 (yRt )
@yRt
+ (1  t)@n2 (y
R
t )
@yRt
: (46)
Hence, since yRt < =; it follows from Corollary 1 that n1(y
R
t )   n2(yRt ) > 0; and therefore,
noting (44),
@yR(t)
@t

yyR
< 0 8t 2 [0;  ]: (47)
3. Noting (11) fertility is positively a¤ected by output per worker, and thus it follows from
(28) that for any t 2 [0;  ]:
tn
1(yRt ) + (1  t)n2(yRt ) S 1 8yt S yRt (t) . (48)

Proof of Lemma 6.
1. As established in (30), yt+1   yt = 0 if and only if:
1 + g(t; yt) = [tn
1(yt) + (1  t)n2(yt)]: (49)
Hence since [tn1(y
R
t ) + (1   t)n2(yRt )] = 1; and g(t; yRt ) = 0 it follows that (t; yR(t)) 2
yy 8t 2 [0;  ]:
2. As established in (29), yt+1   yt = 0 if and only if  (t; yt)  yt = 0: As follows from (30),
@yt
@t

yt+1 yt=0
=
[n1(yt)  n2(yt)]  g(t; yt)
gy(t; yt)  [t @n1 (yt)@yt + (1  t)
@n2 (yt)
@yt
]
:
Hence, it follows from (A2) that along the yy locus, that denominator does not vanish, and
there exists a decreasing continuous, single-valued function y(t) 2 (yR(t); =) such that:
(t; y(t)) 2 yy
where 8t 2 [0; ^)
@yt
@t

yt+1 yt=0
< 0.
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Moreover, as follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem, noting (A2), limt!^y(t) = y
R(^),
y(0) 2 (y; =), and ^ 2 [;  ]:
3. As established in Lemma 1, tn1(yt) + (1   t)n2(yt) < 1 iff yt < yRt (t). Hence since
g(t; yt) = 0 for all yt  yRt ; it follows that
yt+1   yt > 0 if 0 < yt  yRt
As follows from Assumption (A2), yt+1   yt < 0 if and only if yR(t) < yt < y(t) and
t 2 [0; ^): 
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